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Abstract
Two dimensional driven-dissipative flows are generally integrable via a
conservation law that is singular at equilibria. Nonintegrable dynamical
systems are confined to n≥3 dimensions. Even driven-dissipative
deterministic dynamical systems that are critical, chaotic or complex have n-1
local time-independent conservation laws that can be used to simplify the
geometric picture of the flow over as many consecutive time intervals as one
likes. Those conservation laws generally have either branch cuts, phase
singularities, or both. The consequence of the existence of singular
conservation laws for experimental data analysis, and also for the search for
scale-invariant critical states via uncontrolled approximations in
deterministic dynamical systems, is discussed. Finally, the expectation of
ubiquity of scaling laws and universality classes in dynamics is contrasted
with the possibility that the most interesting dynamics in nature may be
nonscaling, nonuniversal, and to some degree computationally complex.
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Introduction
It is expected that any system of ordinary differential equations generating
critical (at a border of chaos), chaotic, or complex motions must be both
nonlinear and "nonintegrable". The idea of "integrability" (complete
integrability) vs. "nonintegrability" (or "incomplete integrability") goes back
to Jacobi and Lie. The first example of a chaotic "nonintegrable" system was
discovered via geometric analysis in phase space by Poincaré [1]. The first
analytic evidence of "everywhere dense chaos" in a two-degree of freedom
Hamiltonian system was discovered by Koopman and von Neumann [2].
Many experts still argue over the meaning of integrability vs. nonintegrability
[3], and so misconceptions among physicists are abundant.
The ambiguity inherent in any serious attempt to distinguish "integrability"
from "nonintegrability" was expressed poetically by Poincaré, who stated that
a dynamical system is generally neither integrable nor nonintegrable, but is
more or less integrable [4]. For physicists, the explanation of various roots to
chaos (via period doubling [5], e.g.) has tended to submerge rather than
clarify the question how to distinguish those two ideas, but without
eliminating many of the misconceptions about nonintegrability. Modern
mathematicians have managed to give precise definitions of nonintegrability
[6b,7] that are very hard to translate into simpler mathematical language.
With the explosion of interest in "complex dynamical systems" [8,9] it would
be helpful to have a clearer idea, in ordinary words, of what
"nonintegrability" means, especially as many articles about dynamics use
terms that are either ambiguous or completely undefined: randomness, self-
3
3
organization, self-organized criticality, complexity, complex adaptable system,
and nonintegrability some are examples.
In an otherwise stimulating and revolutionary paper [9] Moore, has stated
that for   "... integrable systems ... a formula could be found for all time
describing a system's future state." He also states that for chaotic systems "...
we were forced to relax our definition of what constitutes a solution to the
problem, since no formula exists. Instead, we content ourselves with
measuring and describing the various statistical properties of a system, its
scaling behavior and so on: we can do this because the individual trajectories
are essentially random." These claims are often used to describe integrability
and chaos at the level of popularized folklore [10], but they are wrong from
both analytic and computational standpoints (Moore's article is about
computability theory in the context of theoretical dynamics, not about
experimental-data analysis). As a counter-example the binary Bernoulli shift,
a so-called "paradigm" of "nonintegrability", has unique solutions that are
given for all discrete times n by the simple formula xn = 2nxo mod 1. No
"integrable" problem, including the simple harmonic oscillator, has a simpler
solution (transcendental functions are required to describe the harmonic
oscillator, whereas we only need simple algebra or easy decimal arithmetic to
describe the Bernoulli shift). I will discuss "nonintegrability" and then argue
that a misunderstanding of what it means can lead to uncontrolled
approximations to critical, chaotic or complex dynamical systems that are both
quantitatively and qualitatively wrong.
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Time reversibility and analyticity
For the sake of clarity and precision I frame my discussion in the context of
flows in phase space,
dx
dt
 = V(x)
,       (1)
where phase space is a flat inner product space so that the n axes labeled by
(x1,...,xn) can be regarded as Cartesian [11], and V(x) is an n-component time-
independent velocity field. Newtonian dynamical systems can always be
rewritten in this form whether or not the variables xi defining the system in
physical three dimensional space are Cartesian (for example, we can have     
x1 = θ and x2 = dθ/dt, where θ is an angular variable). Flows that preserve the
Cartesian volume element dΩ = dx1...dxn are defined by ∇⋅V = 0
(conservative flows) while driven dissipative-flows correspond to ∇⋅V ≠  0,
where 
 
∇ denotes the Cartesian gradient in n dimensions.
The condition for a flow is that for any initial condition xo the solution        
xi(t) = U(t)xio = ψi(xo1,...xon,t) has no finite time singularities [6]; singularities
of streamlines of flows are confined to the complex time plane. The time
evolution operator U(t) exists and defines a one parameter transformation
group for all finite times t, with the inverse operator given by U-1(t) = U(-t), so
that one can in principle integrate backward in time, xoi = U(-t)xi(t) =
ψi(x1(t),...xn(t),-t), as well as forward. Note that the same function ψi describes
integrations both forward and backward in time.
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Many chaos researchers believe in floating point arithmetic the way that
fundamentalists believe in heaven and hell (the latter cite the Bible for
support, while the former rely on a literal interpretation of a purely formal
abstraction called "the shadowing lemma"). Uncontrollable errors are
introduced into numerical integrations by the use of floating point arithmetic
and those errors violate time reversibility even in the simplest possible cases.
Even for a nonchaotic driven-dissipative flow those errors prevent accurate
numerical solutions either forward or backward in time [11]. The simplest
example is given by the one dimensional flow  dy/dt = y, all of whose
streamlines have the positive Liapunov exponent λ = 1 forward in time, and
the negative Liapunov exponent λ = - 1  backward in time. Consequently, the
simple linear equation dy/dt = y cannot be integrated forward in time
accurately numerically, for long times, if floating point arithmetic is used.
Contrary to superficial appearances based upon the unwarranted
extrapolation of numerical calculations, time reversal is not violated by the
Lorenz model
   d x1
d t
= σ (x2 ± x1)
d x2
d t
= ρx1 ± x2 ± x1x3
d x3
d t
= ± βx3 + x1x2
.    (1b)
Let zn denote the maxima of a time series [12] of x3(t) at discrete times to, t1,
..., tn, ... , where tn-tn-1 denotes the time lag between successive maxima         
zn-1 = x3(tn-1) and zn = x3(tn). Formally, by paying attention to the implicit
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function theorem, it is possible to reduce any three dimensional flow to a
uniquely-invertible two dimensional iterated map [11]
xn = G1(xn-1,zn-1)
zn = G2(xn-1,zn-1)
.       (1c)
Uncontrolled numerical integrations suggest the one dimensional cusp map     
zn = f(zn-1)  shown in figure 1.  No one has yet explained why the Lorenz
model should give rise, in any applicable approximation, to a one
dimensional map. To the extent that the Lorenz model can be described
approximately by a one dimensional map, that map can not have a double-
valued inverse zn-1 = f-1(zn): backward integration zn-1 = U(tn-1 -tn)zn =
ψ3(xn,yn,zn,tn-1-tn) is unique for a flow, and the Lorenz model satisfies the
boundedness condition for a flow [12]. Therefore, Lorenz's one dimensional
cusp map zn = f(zn-1) of figure 1 is not continuous and may even be infinitely
fragmented and nondifferentiable in order that the inverse map f-1 doesn't
have two branches.
In the field of cosmology, the assumption that initial conditions of the early
universe can be discovered from observable galaxy distributions can easily be
challenged by anyone who has tried to integrate the double pendulum
equations of motion forward for not very-long times, while using floating
point arithmetic, and then backward in time in an attempt to recover even
one digit of an initial condition [11].
Surprise has been expressed (perhaps ironically, in order to stress a point) that
it was found possible to describe a certain chaotic flow by a formula in the
form of an infinite series [3], but "nonintegrable" can not mean not solvable:
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any flow, even a critical, chaotic or complex one, has a unique, well-defined
solution so long as the velocity field V(x) satisfies a Lipshitz condition (or is at
least once continuously differentiable) with respect to the n variables xi. If, in
addition, the velocity field is analytic in those variables then the power series
 xi(t ) = xio + t (Lxi )o + t2 (L2xi )o /2 + ....,    (2)
where L = V⋅∇, has a nonvanishing radius of convergence, so that the
solution of (1) can in principle be described by power series combined with
analytic continuation for all finite times [1]. It has long been known that this
is not a practical prescription for the calculation of trajectories at long times.
The point is that a large category of deterministic chaotic and perhaps even
complex motions are precisely determined over any desired number of finite
time intervals by analytic formulae.  The Lorenz model (1b) provides an
example. This is impossible for the case of truly "random" motion (like α-
particle decays), where the specification of an initial condition does not
determine a trajectory at all, or for Langevin descriptions of diffusive motion,
where the trajectories are continuous but are everywhere nondifferentiable
(as in Wiener's functional integral).  In uncontrolled approximations these
separate ideas are sometimes confused together in a way that is impossible to
untangle.
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Complete integrability
To define the idea of complete integrability we return to Jacobi [7] and Lie
[13]. A completely integrable dynamical system has n-1 time-independent
first integrals (conservation laws) Gi(x1,...,xn) = Ci satisfying the linear partial
differential equation
dGi
dt  = V⋅∇G i = Vk
∂Gi
∂xk
 = 0
  (3)
along any streamline of the flow. In addition, these conservation laws must
(in principle, but not necessarily constructively) determine n-1 "isolating
integrals" of the form xk = gk(xn,C1,...,Cn-1) for k = 1,...,n-1. When all of this
holds then the global flow is simply a time-translation for all finite times t in
the Lie coordinate system
yi = Gi(x1,...,xn) = Ci, i = 1,...,n-1
yn = F(x1,...,xn) = t + D       (4)
defined by the n-1 conservation laws, and the system is called completely
integrable: the solution reduces in principle to n independent (rather than
coupled, as in Picard's iterative procedure) integrations, and the flow is
confined to a two-dimensional manifold that may be either flat or curved and
is determined by the intersection of the n-1 global conservation laws (for a
canonical Hamiltonian flow with f degrees of freedom, f commuting
conservation laws confine the flow to a constant speed translation an f
dimensional flat manifold). The nth transformation function F(x1,...,xn) is
defined by integrating dt = dxn/Vn(x1,...,xn) = dx/vn(xn,C1,...,Cn-1) to yield           
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t + D = f(xn,C1,...,Cn-1). One then uses the n-1 conservation laws to eliminate
the constants Ci in favor of the  n-1 variables xi in f to obtain the function F.
Whether one can carry out all or any of this constructively, in practice, is
geometrically irrelevant: in the description (4) of the flow all effects of
interactions have been eliminated globally via a coordinate transformation.
The transformation (4) "parallelizes" (or "rectifies" [6]) the flow: the
streamlines of (1) in the y-coordinate system are parallel to a single axis yn for
all times, where the time evolution operator is a simple time-translation     
U(t) = etd/dyn.  
Although time-dependent first integrals are stressed in discussions of
integrable cases of driven-dissipative flows like the Lorenz model [3], there is
generally no essential difference between (3) and the case of n time-dependent
first integrals G'i(x1,...,xn,t) = C'i  satisfying
dGi
dt  = V⋅∇G i + 
  ∂Gi
∂t  = 0
.        (3b)
Paying attention to the implicit function theorem, one conservation law
G'n(x1,...,xn,t) = C'n can be used to determine a function t = F'(x1,...,xn,C'n),
whose substitution into the other n-1 time-dependent conservation laws
yields n-1 time-independent ones satisfying (3). The n initial conditions         
xio = U(-t)xi(t) of (1) satisfy (3b) and therefore qualify as time-dependent
conservation laws, but initial conditions of (1) are generally only trivial local
conservation laws: dynamically seen, there is no qualitative difference
between backward and forward integration in time. Nontrivial global
conservation laws are provided by the initial conditions yio, for i = 1, 2, ... ,      
n-1, of a completely integrable flow in the Lie coordinate system (4), where the
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streamlines are parallel for all finite times: dyi/dt = 0, i = 1,...,n-1, and        
dyn/dt = 1.  
According to the Lie transformation (4) a completely integrable noncanonical
flow is equivalent to a constant speed translation and is confined for all finite
times t to a two-dimensional manifold. That manifold may be either curved
or flat, and algebraic or at least analytic conservation laws [3] have generally
been assumed to be necessary in order to obtain complete integrability. For
example, Euler's description of a torque-free rigid body [11, 14]
   d L 1
d t
= a L 2L 3
d L 2
d t
= ± bL 1L 3
d L
d t
= c L 1L 2
,    (5)
with positive constants a , b , and c satisfying a - b + c = 0, defines a phase flow
in three dimensions that is confined to a two dimensional sphere that follows
from angular momentum conservation  L12 + L22 + L32  = L2. Here, we have
completely integrable motion that technically violates the naive expectation
that each term in (4) should be given by a single  function: for each period τ of
the motion, the transformation function F has four distinct branches due to
the turning points of the three Cartesian components Li of angular momenta
on the sphere. In general, any "isolating integral" gk describing bounded
motion must be multivalued at a turning point.
Since the time of Kowalevskaya some mathematicians have defined first
integrals Gk of dynamical systems to be analytic or at least continuous [6]
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(however, see also ref. [6b] where nonanalytic functions as first integrals are
also discussed). This is an arbitrary restriction that is not always necessary in
order to generate the transformation (4) over all finite times: a two-
dimensional flow in phase space, including a driven-dissipative flow, is
generally integrable via a conservation law but that conservation law is
typically singular. The conservation law is simply the function that describes
the two-dimensional phase portrait and is singular at sources and sinks like
attractors and repellers (equilibria and limit cycles provide examples of
attractors and repellers in driven-dissipative planar flows) [11]. For the
damped simple harmonic oscillator, for example, the conservation law has
been constructed analytically [15] and is logarithmically singular at the sink.
The planar flow where dr/dt = r and dθ/dt = 0 in cylindrical coordinates (r,θ)
describes radial flow out of a source at r = 0. The conservation law is simply θ,
which is constant along every streamline and is undefined at r = 0. This
integrable flow is parallelizeable for all finite times t simply by excluding one
point, the source at r = 0 (infinite time would be required to leave or reach an
equilibrium point, and no one should care what happens in the completely
unphysical limit of infinite time). "Nonintegrable" flows generally can not
occur in the phase plane. What about in three or more dimensions?
"Nonintegrability"
A completely integrable flow is described by the formulae (4) for all finite
times t and is parallel to a single axis yn (the n Lie coordinates yi are generally
locally orthogonal on a flat or curved two dimensional manifold). In contrast,
there is also an idea of local integrability [6,16]: one can parallelize an
arbitrary flow (including chaotic and complex ones) about any
12
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nonequilibrium point, meaning about any point xo where the velocity field
V(x) does not vanish. The size ε(xo) of the region where this parallelization
holds is finite  and depends nonuniversally on the n gradients of the velocity
field.  By analytic continuation [6b,17], local parallelization of the flow yields
n-1 nontrival "local" conservation laws yi = Gi(x) = Ci that hold out to the
first singularity of any one of the n-1 functions Gi, in agreement with the
demands of the theory of first order linear partial differential equations (the
linear partial differential equation (3) always has n-1 functionally
independent solutions, but the solutions may be singular [15]).
Consider the streamline of a "nonintegrable" flow that passes through a
nonequilibrium point xo at time t = 0. Let t(xo) then denote the time required
for the trajectory to reach the first singularity of one of the conservation laws
Gk. Such a singularity must exist, otherwise the flow would be confined for
all finite times ("globally") to a single, smooth two-dimensional manifold.
The global existence of a two-dimensional manifold can be prevented, for
example, by singularities that make the n-1 conservation laws Gi multivalued
in an extension of phase space to complex variables [6b]. Generally, as with
the solutions defined locally by the series expansion (2), the n-1 local
conservation laws Gi will be defined locally by infinite series, with radii of
convergence determined by the singularities in the complex extension of
phase space. The formulae (4) then hold for a finite time 0≤t<t(xo) that is
determined by the distance from xo to the nearest complex singularity. Let
x1(xo) denote the point in phase space where that singularity occurs.
Following Arnol'd's [6] statement of the "basic theorem of ordinary
differential equations", we observe that the streamline of a flow (1) passing
through xo can not be affected by the singularity at x1 in the following
13
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superficial sense (consistent with the fact that the singularities of the
functions Gi are either branch cuts or phase singularities): we can again
parallelize the flow about the singular point x1(xo) and can again describe the
streamline for another finite time t(xo)≤t<t(x1) by another set of parallelized
flow equations of the form (4), where t(x1) is the time required to reach the
next singularity x2(xo) of any one of the n-1 conservation laws Gi, starting
from the second initial condition x1. Reparallelizing the flow about any one
of these singularities reminds us superficially of resetting the calendar when
crossing the international dateline, excepting that a nonintegrable flow is not
confined to a globally analytic two dimensional manifold. Two points follow.  
First, a "nonintegrable" flow is "piecewise integrable" in the sense that
different sets of formulae of the form (4) hold in principle for consecutive
finite time intervals 0≤t(xo)<t(x1), t(x1)≤t<t(x2), ... t(xn-1)≤t<t(xn), .... , giving
geometric meaning to Poincaré's dictum [3] that a dynamical system is
generally neither integrable nor nonintegrable but is more or less integrable.
Nonintegrable flows are describable over arbitrarily-many consecutive time
intervals by the simple formulae of the form (4) except at countably many
singular points x1(x), x2(x), ...  , where the n-1 initial conditions yio and the
constant D must be reset. Contrast this with the claim of ref. [9] discussed
above where the use of the word "formula" was not restricted (there are
completely integrable cases where no formula for F in (4) has been "found", if
the word "found" is construed to mean construction rather than merely
mathematical existence). The distinction between completely and
incompletely integrable dynamical systems is therefore technical and difficult
to make, but it is not purely semantic (see chapter 6 of reference [6b] for a
more detailed discussion of the causes of "nonintegrability").
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Second, we consider the implication for interpretations of Taken's embedding
theorem [18,19], which has sometimes led to the expectation that the
dimension n of a chaotic dynamical system may be computationally
compressible (replacement of a high dimensional flow by a lower
dimensional one). Consider a critical or chaotic flow (1) with dimension n≥4.
If we should find that some class of trajectories (meaning some class of initial
conditions [11]) yields a fractal dimension Do ≈ 2.1, e.g, then this would not
mean that the flow can be studied for long times on a flat three dimensional
manifold: a three dimensional system of differential equations describing a
flow (1) with n≥4 could only arise from the elimination of n-3 variables via   
n-3 generally singular conservation laws, which would place the flow on a
section of a three dimensional manifold that is generally both singular and
curved, and even then only over a finite time interval bounded by the time
t(xo) out to the first singularity starting from some initial condition xo. In
other words, that a flow may be locally three dimensional does not mean that
we can lift it out of ten dimensions and embed it globally in three
dimensions. Smooth m dimensional manifolds that can be embedded in n
dimensions are not necessarily embeddable in m<n dimensions: four
dimensional geodesic flows on compact two dimensional manifolds of
constant negative curvature provide an example [20].
A topologically-correct description of a higher dimensional chaotic dynamical
system by a lower dimensional one is possible, via symbol sequences and
their statistical distributions, but only if the two systems belong to the same
topologic universality class [21,21b] (spectra of Liapunov exponents and
fractal dimensions are not topologic invariants).
15
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We argue next, heuristically, that the existence of singular conservation laws
for deterministic dynamical systems has important consequences for
approximations and modelling in theoretical physics.
Universality classes, statistics, and scaling laws
There are many different phenomena in nature that seem, more or less,
approximately to obey scaling laws of one sort or another. Since the success of
the renormalization group method in describing approximate scaling laws
near second order phase transitions in statistical mechanics, and since fractals
have been found to occur in both critical and chaotic deterministic dynamical
systems, many physicists have come to believe that scaling laws may be
ubiquitous in nature. Some physicists even expect a general explanation of
scaling laws that occur in nature in terms of universally-valid dynamics that
yield scaling exponents free of parameter-tuning.
One prescription for scale-invariant correlations is supposed to be a driven-
dissipative system with one conserved quantity [22], with the dynamics
perturbed externally by "random noise". A partial realization of this
prescription has been demonstrated for a certain class of linear partial
differential equations satisfying special boundary conditions. The addition of
nonlinear terms breaks the asymptotic scale invariance reflected in the
correlation function G(r) ≈ r -d of the linear theory, where d is the dimension
of the system (compare with G(r) ≈ r -d+2 for the Laplace equation when d>2)
if those terms are significant enough not to be perturbatively approximable in
the renormalization group method, which is usually an uncontrolled
16
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approximation. A related question is whether an intractable nonlinear
equation can be replaced by a more tractable one subject to external noise [22],
as in comparisons of the deterministic Kuramoto-Sivashinsky partial
differential equation with the noise-driven KPZ equation [23]. We expect
that the conclusions stated below for flows will carry over to diffusive
deterministic partial differential equations.
In a deterministic dynamical system (1) that is either critical or chaotic, a
qualitatively-correct description of the motion via a perturbative treatment of
nonlinear terms in an otherwise linear (or nonlinear but integrable) system is
impossible. In particular, neither chaotic nor critical orbits can be described by
noisy orbits of an otherwise linear (or nonlinear but integrable) system.  The
replacement of intractable nonlinear terms by "random noise" in an
uncontrolled approximation may violate geometric constraints imposed by
the deterministic system's local conservation laws.
In contrast with reasoning based upon nonlinear or random perturbations of
linear dynamics, the addition of linear damping and driving to an important
class of deterministic conservative nonlinear systems (nonstandard Euler-
Lagrange equations with nonintegrable velocities like angular momenta as
variables, like (5) [11], e.g.) leads to self-confined motion and, via
bifurcations, to nontrivial critical behavior and chaotic attractors in phase
space [12]. The Lorenz model provides a simple example. Formally, the
Lorenz model defines a certain linearly damped and driven symmetric top:
simply set a = 0, and b = c = 1, in (5), which then coincides with (1b) if we
throw away all of the linear terms in the latter.
17
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The prescription for noise-driven scale-invariant correlations is based on the
expectation that conservation laws are not typical for driven-dissipative
dynamical systems, that by imposing "local conservation" [22] we can change
the dynamics. Because dynamical systems (1) already have a complete set of
local first integrals the freedom of choice that would permit the imposition of
extra constraints does not exist in the case of deterministic ordinary
differential equations.
A refinement of the condition of "local conservation" has been offered as a
definition of "self-organized criticality" (SOC) by Anderson [8], who states
that "a system driven by some conserved or quasi-conserved quantity
uniformly at a large scale, but able to dissipate it only to microscopic
fluctuations, may have fluctuations at all intermediate scales,... . The
canonical case of SOC is turbulence ... ." See also reference [23] for a slightly
more refined definition of SOC where the emphasis is on two widely-
separated time scales, a very short time scale for slow external driving at large
length scales vs. a relatively long time scale for dissipation via diffusion at
very short length scales (as is characteristic of eddy-cascades at all Reynolds
numbers in fluid dynamics).
Anderson's attempt to define SOC would describe fluid turbulence in open
flows (the Richardson-Kolmogorov eddy-cascade at high Reynold's numbers,
e.g.) if we could replace the word "fluctuations" with the phrase "a hierarchy
of eddies where the eddy-cascade is generated by successive instabilities". The
empirical evidence suggests that neither laminar nor turbulent eddy-cascades
are critical (meaning metastable behavior [23] dominated by a vanishing
Liapunov exponent): vortex-instability cascades yield rapid mixing even at
18
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low Reynolds numbers [24] of 15 to 20, and rapid mixing suggests the action
of at least one positive Liapunov exponent. Correspondingly, the dissipation
rate per unit mass for the dissipation range of turbulent open flows [24]
suggests a Liapunov exponent on the order of ln2.
From an entirely different and very formal perspective it has been argued that
it may be possible to replace the Navier-Stokes equations asymptotically by a
finite dimensional autonomous phase flow of the form (1) [25,26], but it is
not clear whether this argument can be correct.
No model exhibiting both criticality and scaling laws that are independent of
parameter tuning has ever been constructed from any set of deterministic
differential equations, including block-spring models, which are supposed to
represent the essence of SOC [22,27]. In the models used to try to define SOC,
universality classes are supposed to be identified on the basis of one or a few
scaling exponents, but a few scaling exponents are generally not adequate to
define a dynamical universality class unambiguously in the  interaction of
many degrees of freedom far from thermal equilibrium.
I explain my assertion via an example that is apparently unstable rather than
metastable: in the inertial range of fluid turbulence the experimental data are
precise enough to pin down only one velocity structure function scaling
exponent ζo, which in turn determines only one fractal dimension Do = 3 - ζo
≈ 2.91. Infinitely many different multifractal generating functions are
consistent with the experimentally-measured nonlinear scaling exponents ζp
for p>10 [24,28]. Each multifractal generating function, in turn, is consistent,
to within experimental accuracy, with infinitely many different and
19
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completely unrelated abstract (and generally unphysical) dynamical models,
some deterministic and some stochastic. My point is simple: it is too easy to
construct an ad hoc model with no known connection to the Navier-Stokes
equations that reproduces the entire spectrum of velocity structure function
scaling exponents to within experimental accuracy.
A sharper result is known for the measured energy transfer rate near the
Kolmogorov length scale: the experimentally-extracted statistics (binomial,
with p1/p2 ≈ 3/7) and generating partition (ln ≈ 2-n) are trivially reproduced by
the binary tent map for a "measure zero" class of initial conditions. The
binary tent map has no known connection to the physics of eddy cascades,
other than that complete binary-cascading is observed visually near the
Kolmogorov limit of the dissipation range, for a local Reynolds number near
unity, in the the ink-droplet experiment [28]. In the inertial range the vortex
birth rate suggested by the fit of the β-model, in the determination of ζo, is on
the order of octal and incomplete. For nonturbulent cascades the observed
birth rate ranges from (incomplete) pentagonal or hexagonal at a local
Reynolds number of 15 down to complete binary for R ≈ 1. For more recent
discussions of scaling law phenomenology for eddy cascades in the inertial
and dissipation ranges, see references [28b,c, and d].
A few scaling exponents can be used to distinguish different classes of one
dimensional unimodal maps from each other at the period doubling critical
point, but in this case the order of the maximum of a unimodal map (via a
nonperturbative renormalization group method) defines a universality class
analogous to the universality classes defined by symmetry and dimension at
second order phase transitions in equilibrium statistical mechanics [29]. In
20
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the case of SOC, no corresponding definition has been given, which is
essentially the same as saying that a clear definition of SOC has not yet been
given. In the case of so-called "complex adaptable systems" [8], there is no
attempt to universality classes. Hence, there is effectively no definition of
"complex adaptable systems". It is not clear that a sand pile automaton, or an
arbitrary model of a so-called "complex adaptable system", can provide a
topologically-correct description of any dynamical system that occurs in
physics, chemistry, or biology. In the case of sand pile models, some block
spring models agree in part with SOC ideas (but for a system that is chaotic
rather than critical [27b]), whereas others do not [27].
Complexity vs. scaling and universality
Scale invariance based upon criticality has been offered as an approach to
"complex space-time phenomena" based upon the largely unfulfilled
expectation of finding that universal scaling laws, generated dynamically by
many interacting  degrees of freedom and yielding critical states that are
independent of parameter-tuning [22,23], are ubiquitous in nature. This is
equivalent to expecting that nature is mathematically relatively simple,
something that Newton, to his severe dismay, learned to be false when he
invented perturbation theory in an attempt to solve the three-body problem
for the moon's motion. Many physicists apparently can not understand why
Newton gave up science for alchemy, religion, politics and finance, but then
most physicists have never attempted to solve the three body problem.
The incompressible Navier-Stokes equations are formally invariant under
the scaling transformation x' = λx, v' = λαv, and t' = λ1−αt, which leaves the
21
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Reynolds number invariant. This scale invariance encourages the expectation
that the velocity structure functions may be scale invariant with  exponents
ζp as well, and also permits the formulation of the idea that the f(α) spectrum
may be useful for describing a distribution of velocity-field singularities that
may occur in the limit of infinite Reynolds numbers. With due respect for the
program of research that is advocated in ref. [22,23], however, the greater
problem for science may be to discover and account for turbulent flows where
the velocity structure functions do not obey scaling laws. To discover
nonscaling behavior is probably not difficult experimentally, but under the
expectation that the most significant phenomena in nature obey scaling laws
and some sort of universality such results would likely be classified by many
physicists as "uninteresting".
It has recently been discovered that there is a far greater and far more
interesting degree of complicated behavior in nonlinear dynamics than either
criticality or deterministic chaos: systems of billiard balls combined with
mirrors [30], and even two-dimensional maps [9,31] can exhibit universal
computational capacity (via formal equivalence to a Turing machine). A
system of nine first order quasi-linear partial differential equations has been
offered as a computationally-universal system [32]. A quasi-linear first order
partial differential equation in n variables can be replaced by a linear one in
n+1 variables. Maximum computational complexity is apparently possible in
systems of linear first order partial differential equations. When is complexity
of this sort not allowed?
If a deterministic dynamical system has a generating partition [21] then the
symbolic dynamics can in principle be solved and the future behavior can be
22
2 2
understood qualitatively, without the need to compute specific trajectories
algorithmically from the algorithmic construction of a specific computable
initial condition [24]. In other words, a high degree of "computational
compressibility" holds even if the dynamical system is orbitally-metastable
("critical") or orbitally-unstable ("chaotic").
A chaotic dynamical system generates infinitely-many different classes of
statistical distributions for different classes of initial conditions (at most one
distribution is differentiable). The generating partition, if it exists, uniquely
forms the support of every possible statistical distribution and also
characterizes the particular dynamical system. For phase flows and iterated
maps, criticality and deterministic chaos can be distinguished from dynamics
with universal computational complexity by the existence of a generating
partition.  For a system with a generating partition, topologic universality
classes exist that permit one to study the simplest system in the universality
class (the infinity of statistical distributions is topologically invariant and
therefore can not be used to discern or characterize a particular dynamical
system in a universality class). For maps of the unit interval, both the
symmetric and asymmetric logistic maps of the unit interval peaking at or
above unity belong to the trivial universality class of the binary tent map
[24]. The two dimensional Henon map is much harder but is still solvable: it
belongs to the universality class of chaotic logistic maps of the unit interval
peaking beneath unity [21] (the simplest model defining this universality
class is the symmetric tent map with slope magnitude between 1 and 2). In
these systems the long-time behavior can be understood qualitatively and
statistically in advance, so that the future holds no surprises: the generating
partition and symbol sequences can be used to describe the motion at long
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times to within any desired degree of precision, and multifractal scaling laws
(via the D(λ) spectrum, e.g.) show how finer-grained pictures of trajectories
are related to coarser-grained ones.  
For a dynamical system with universal computational capability, in contrast,
a classification into topologic universality classes is impossible [9]. Given an
algorithm for the computation of an initial condition to as many digits as
computer time allows, nothing can be said in advance about the future either
statistically or otherwise  other than to compute the dynamics, with
controlled precision for that initial condition, iteration by iteration, to see
what falls out: there is no computational compressibility that allows us to
summarize the system's long-time behavior, either statistically or otherwise.
In contrast with the case where topologic universality classes exist there is no
organization of a hierarchy of periodic orbits, stable, marginally stable, or
unstable, that allows us to understand the fine-grained behavior of an orbit
from the coarse-grained behavior via scaling laws, or to divine the very
distant future for arbitrary (so-called "random") initial conditions from the
symbolic dynamics.  Certainly, there can be no scaling laws that hold
independently of a very careful choice of classes of  initial conditions, if at all.
We do not know if fluid turbulence or Newton's three-body problem fall into
this category.
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Social Darwinism and Malthusian biology
Contrary to recent expectations [18,34] and extraordinary claimsa, there is no
evidence to suggest that abstract dynamical systems theoryb can be used either
to explain or understand socio-economic behavior. Billiard balls and
gravitating bodies have no choice but to follow mathematical trajectories that
are laid out deterministically, beyond the possibility of human convention,
invention, or intervention, by Newton's laws of motion. The law of
probability of a Brownian particle evolves deterministically according to the
diffusion equation, also beyond the possibility of human convention,
invention, or intervention. In stark contrast, a mind that directs the
movements of a body continually makes willful and arbitrary decisions at
arbitrary times that cause it to deviate from any mathematical trajectory
(deterministic models) or evolving set of probabilities (stochastic models)
assigned to it in advance. Given a hypothetical set of probabilities for a
decision at one instant, there is no algorithm that tells us how to compute the
probabilities correctly for later times (excepting at best the trivial case of curve-
fitting at very short times, and then only if nothing changes significantly), or
even when later decisions will be made. Two disputants in an argument, or
two promenaders on a path, can think and choose to alter their courses in
order to avoid a collision (or can choose to collide), whereas two billiard balls,
or two planets, on a collision course have no similar possibility.
Socio-economic statistics can not be known in advance of their occurrence
because, to begin with, there are no known, correct socio-economic laws of
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motion. We can describe and understand tornadoes and hurricanes
mathematically because Newton's laws apply, in spite of the fact that the
earth's atmosphere is an open dynamical system, but we can not understand
the collapse of the Soviet Union or the financial crisis in Mexico on the basis
of any known set of dynamics equations, in spite of the fact that the world
economy forms a closed financial system. I have argued elsewhere that
trajectories and probabilities for socio-economic "motion", which are only
motions in an Aristotelian rather than Galilean sense, are not computable
[35].
Some degrees of complexity are defined precisely in computer science [36]
but these definitions have not satisfied some physicists [8,37,37b]. According
to von Neumann [38] a system is complex when it is easier to build than to
describe mathematically. Under this qualitative definition the Henon map is
not complex but a living cell is.  Earlier claims to the contrary [39,40], where
complexity was confused with information, there is as yet no model of a
dynamic theory of the evolution of biologic complexity, not over short time
intervals (cell to embryo to adult) and certainly not over very long time
intervals (inorganic matter to organic matter to metabolizing cells and
beyond). Correspondingly, there is no physico-chemical definition of the
development of different degrees of complexity in nonlinear dynamics. No
one knows if universal computational capability is necessary for biologic
evolution, although DNA molecules in solution apparently can be made to
compute [41] (but not error-free, as with a Turing machine or other
deterministic dynamical system).
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It has been speculated that computational universality should be possible in a
conservative three degree of freedom Newtonian model [9], but so far no one
has constructed an example. We do not yet know the minimum number of
degrees of freedom necessary for universal computational capability in a set of
driven-dissipative equations (1) (the Omohundro model [32] is driven-
dissipative). Diffusive motion is generally time-irreversible (U-1(t) doesn't
exist for diffusive motion), but arguments have been made that some
diffusive dynamical systems have an asymptotic limit where the motion is
time reversible on a finite dimensional attractor [26.42], and is therefore
generated by a finite dimensional deterministic dynamical system (1).
However, if a diffusive dynamical system (the Navier-Stokes equations, e.g.)
should be found to be computationally-universal then it will be impossible to
discover a single attractor that would permit the derivation of scaling laws for
eddy cascades in open flows, or in other flows, independently of specific
classes of boundary and initial conditions.
Whenever universal computational capability is generated by a deterministic
or diffusive dynamical system then the usual notions of universality classes
in statistical physics and deterministic chaos fail, and that dynamical system
can only be studied in special cases defined by specific classes of boundary and
initial conditions. It seems unlikely that scaling and universality classes will
be useful in the understanding of biology, which is too hard to be left entirely
to the biologists [43] c.
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Reductionism and Newtonian complexity
"Reductionism" is criticized by "holists" (see the introduction to ref. [8] and
also [47], e.g.). Some holists propose to mathematize Darwinism in order to go
beyond physics and chemistry, but they have not been able use dynamics
models to predict or explain anything that occurs in nature. Physics and
astronomy, since the divorce from Platonic mathematics and Aristotlelian
"holism" in the seventeenth century, have a completely different history (or
"evolution") than "political economy" and most of biology.
Reductionism is the arbitrary division of nature into laws of motion and
initial conditions, plus "the environment". We must always be able to neglect
"the environment" to zeroth order, because if nothing can be isolated then a
correct law of motion can never be discovered. Successful reductionism stems
from Galileo and Descartes, whose discoveries were essential for Newton's
formulation of universally-valid laws of motion and gravity.
Motivated by the question why mathematics works at all in physics,
astronomy, and chemistry, Wigner [48] has made two extremely important
observations: (1) the empirical discovery of mathematical laws of motion that
correctly describe nature is impossible in the absence of empirically-significant
invariance principles, but (2) there are no laws of nature that can tell us the
initial conditions. Following Wigner, laws of nature themselves obey laws
called invariance principles, while initial conditions are completely lawless.
Lawlessness reigns supreme in the socio-economic fields, where nothing of
any significance is left even approximately invariant by socio-economic
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evolution. This is the reason that artificial law ("law") is passed in legislatures
in an attempt to regulate behavior. From the standpoint of nonlinear
dynamics everything of socio-economic significance changes completely
uncontrollably, so that there are not even any fundamental constants.
About initial conditions that occur in nature, theoretical physics, and
especially pure mathematics, has nothing at all to say. Initial conditions
matter when a dynamical system far from thermal equilibrium is chaotic or
complex. The only way to know an "initial condition" (or "present condition"
as Lorenz [12] says) or distribution of initial conditions approximately is to
consult mother nature via measurement. In a driven-dissipative system far
from equilibrium, it is an illusion to expect that we replace our ignorance of
initial conditions by the assumption of "random external noise" like "white
noise" or Gaussian statistics. For example, no one anticipated that the
dissipation range of turbulent open flows would generate binomial statistics
with uneven probabilities p1/p2 = 3/7. There is still no physical explanation of
this simple result.  
There is certainly no observational evidence to indicate that evolving nature
respects the abstractions that pure mathematicians try to sell to us under the
heading of "invariant densities" and "random initial conditions". Assuming
that the motion of a dynamical system is adequately described by assuming
"random initial conditions" is the same as assuming that a deterministic
system evolved from earlier initial conditions into a later state where the
coarsegrained statistics are even: whether or not this assumption is true or
false for a given system observed in nature can be decided only empirically by
measurement, and not by pure mathematics or computer simulations.   
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The notion that nature far from equilibrium can described by "random initial
conditions" is merely a belief that is not supported by any known set of
measurements of nature. In computation, to assume "random initial
conditions" is to presume that initial conditions are lawful: the law in
question is simply the numerical algorithm used by the computer to construct
a pseudorandom sequence of digits.  
The best that can be done theoretically is to study the behavior of dynamical
systems far from equilibrium for different classes of initial and boundary
conditions without prejudicing those studies by assumptions for which there
is no experimental or observational evidence. That approach is implicit in the
method of classification of deterministic dynamical systems into topologic
universality classes.
From the standpoint of Wigner's simple and very beautiful considerations, I
argue that the belief that the initial conditions of the early universe can be
discovered on the basis of physical principles alone (perhaps combined with
illegal backward integrations that use floating point arithmetic) is an illusion.
Any time that a physics paper appears to answer questions that are asked by
theology, then the physicist who does the writing is likely under the
influence of one illusion or another.
With a computationally-universal (and therefore computable) dynamical
system (1), given a specific computable initial condition xo, both that initial
condition and the dynamics can in principle be encoded as the digit string for
another computable initial condition yo. The computable trajectory                
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y(t) = U(t)yo might then in principle be digitally decodable, which would allow
us to learn the trajectory x(t) = U(t)xo for the first initial condition (self-
replication without copying errors). This maximum degree of computational
complexity may be possible in low dimensional nonintegrable conservative
Newtonian dynamics [9,27]. Some features of nonintegrable quantum
systems with a chaotic classical limit (the helium atom, e.g.) have been
studied using uncontrolled approximations based on the low order unstable
periodic orbits of a chaotic dynamical system [49], but we have no hint what
might be the behavior of a low dimensional quantum mechanical system
with a computationally-complex Newtonian limit.
Physics has been declared to be dead from the standpoint of particle physics
[50]. Correspondingly, some practitioners of quantum field theory (so-called
"grand reductionists" [51]d) have retreated from Galilean principles into
Platonic mathematical speculations about cosmology that can never be tested
adequately empirically [50].  
From the perspective of Newtonian mechanics [9, 21b] and nonrelativistic
quantum mechanics [49] (so-called "petty reductionism" [51]) it appears that
the most interesting and significant work for physics has only barely begun.
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Footnotes
a. "From a physicist's viewpoint, though, biology, history, and economics can
be viewed as dynamical systems." [33]
b. By "dynamical system" in this context we mean deterministic and
stochastic ordinary and partial differential equations, and also automata,
including both cellular and noncellular automata, deterministic and
stochastic.
c. Gregor Mendel was a "reductionist" in the Galilean tradition who got
genetics right and thereby started the only mathematical science within
biology. He was trained more as a physicist and mathematician than as a
biologist. Mendel studied under Doppler, e.g., and even taught experimental
physics [44].  Charles Darwin, in contrast, was a "holist" in the spirit of
Aristotle. Darwin used nonmathematical ideas about "competition, natural
selection and adaptation" that stemmed directly from Malthusian socio-
economic policy [45] and therefore from Calvinism. Darwin his
contemporaries (excepting Mendel) imagined an "integrated" picture of
heredity that is completely wrong [46].
d.  "Grand reductionism" consists essentially of the belief that the main job of
physics is to propose a Lagrangian and then analyze its symmetries. "Petty
reductionism" recognizes that writing down a Lagrangian is merely the
beginning rather than the end of the job. To discover whether a Lagrangian or
any other dynamical system has any significance it is first necessary to
understand the stable, unstable, and complex motions (or their quantized
analogues) that are generated by it, and then to see whether they have any
significance for experiment and observation. Petty reductionism emphasizes
that quarks, the standard model, and the rest of particle physics are completely
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irrelevant for understanding turbulence and other macroscopic natural
phenomena (biology can not be "reduced" to quarks in any meaningful way).
Awareness of ideas about complexity, which also belong to petty
reductionism, suggests that it is unlikely that there can be a "final" theory of
particle physics, and instead that more and more new structure ("surprises")
would likely be found at shorter length scales if higher and higher energy
experiments could be performed. The illusion of our ability to discover "final
causes" goes back to Aristotle, and beyond, and does not have a scientific basis.
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Figure Caption
Successive maxima zn of a numerically-computed time series x3(t) for the
Lorenz model are plotted against each other (from reference [24]). The
drawing of a single continuous curve through all of these points would
violate the time-reversibility.
